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ABSTRACT
The paper's arguments include: (1) Medium-of-exchange money will not disappear in the foreseeable
future, although the quantity of base money may continue to decline. (2) In economies with very little
money (e.g., no currency but bank settlement balances at the central bank), monetary policy will be
conducted much as at present by activist adjustment of overnight interest rates. Operating procedures
will be different, however, with payment of interest on reserves likely to become the norm. (3) In
economies without any money there can be no monetary policy. The relevant notion of a general price
level concerns some index of prices in terms of a medium of account. The liabilities of some official
entity might serve as the medium of account, but there could be viable rivals if policy is poor. (4) A
broad commodity-bundle monetary standard could be viable, even with a redemption medium, and there
is scope for quantitative analysis of the properties of such a system. (5) The number of distinct national
currencies may decline sharply, with the emergence of a small number of currency areas and floating
exchange rates across these areas.
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  This paper attempts to address issues relating to the topic of the conference session 
entitled “Money and Monetary Policy in the 21st Century.”  In that futuristic regard, 
probably the most prominent concern is that the continuing rapid development of information 
technology (IT) could lead to the disappearance of money as more IT-intensive methods for 
conducting transactions come to predominate.  Closely related is the suggestion that central 
banks could lose the ability to influence aggregate demand and, therefore, inflation and 
cyclical macro-economic conditions.  These topics lead on into other related concerns 
involving the unit-of-account role of money and exchange rate arrangements.  Of particular 
interest are various proposals for an automatic, non-discretionary, commodity-bundle 
monetary standard.  In what follows I will take up these issues and offer some analysis and 
opinions of my own. 
2. Preliminaries 
  Before turning to the paper’s main discussion, it will be useful to review some 
definitional matters and also two theoretical points.  Terminologically, an economy’s money 
is, by traditional usage, its tangible medium of exchange—i.e., an item that is generally 
acceptable in payment for any commodity.
1  Again by tradition, claims to some primary 
medium of exchange (MOE) are considered part of the money stock if they are convertible 
on demand.  A monetary system of exchange is, accordingly, one in which the vast majority 
of transactions involve money on one side.  A barter system of exchange, by contrast, is one 
in which commodities are directly exchanged without any intermediate conversion into 
money.  Finally, an accounting system of exchange is one in which there is no money but 
exchanges are conducted by means of signals to an accounting network, with debits and 
  1 credits to the wealth accounts of buyers and sellers being effected with each exchange.  In the 
present paper, as in McCallum (1985), I will classify the latter type of system as non-
monetary.  In effect, an accounting system of exchange is a highly efficient form of barter. 
  Many writings emphasize that money typically serves in a second role, besides that as 
the MOE, as a “unit of account.”  Syntactically this usage is illogical, as noted by Wicksell 
(1935, p. 7) and Niehans (1978, p. 118), since money is a tangible object, not an intangible 
unit of measurement.  What makes more sense is to distinguish the medium of account 
(MOA)—a particular commodity or commodity bundle—from the unit of account, which is 
some specified quantity of the MOA.  Then the MOA is a good (or specified bundle of 
goods) some quantity of which serves as the basis for quoting prices in the economy under 
consideration.  Thus, for example, from 1901-1932 the U.S. economy’s MOA was gold 
whereas its unit of account (UOA) was a dollar, defined as 0.04838 ounces of gold.  Since 
1971, by contrast, the MOA for the United States has been Federal Reserve Notes (and 
claims to them), with one dollar serving as the UOA. 
  There is, as mentioned by Wicksell (1935) and Niehans (1978), and emphasized by 
McCallum (1985), no logical necessity for an economy’s MOE to also be its MOA.  But the 
computational benefits of having a MOA, which are sizeable, are incomplete unless the 
MOA is also the MOE.  Accordingly, the MOE in a monetary economy will in most cases 
also be used as the MOA.  In the absence of severe inflation or some other inducement to do 
otherwise, that is, sellers will quote prices in terms of the MOE.  In other words, the MOE 
and MOA tend to coincide. 
  The first theoretical point to be mentioned is that private optimality considerations 
imply that if two assets are held in positive quantities and have equivalent risk 
                                                                                                                                                       
1 See, for example, Wicksell (1935) and Niehans (1978). 
  2 characteristics, then their marginal yields (rates of return) will be equal, when both pecuniary 
and non-pecuniary returns are considered.  In the much-discussed case of short-term 
government securities and government sanctioned fiat money, for example, the rate of 
interest on the security will equal the rate of interest paid on money (typically zero) plus the 
marginal convenience yield provided by money due to its transaction-facilitating properties.
2  
An asset such as a working refrigerator can provide its owner with a lower rate of interest 
than a paper security without being sold off, for another example, because of the services that 
it provides.  The same is true of a beautiful painting.  If two assets have different risk 
characteristics, this type of relationship will be modified so that the riskier asset will 
command a somewhat higher marginal yield (relative to the other asset), but such 
considerations can often be neglected when comparing the yields of short term government 
securities and government provided paper money.  For an extremely simple example of an 
optimizing derivation of this type of marginal yield equality, see McCallum (2000b). 
  The second theoretical point involves the monetary transmission mechanism.  In the 
literature to be discussed, it is typically assumed that control over short-term nominal interest 
rates is sufficient for monetary policy implementation.  To begin with, if the central bank 
controls an overnight rate, then a 25 basis point increase will induce an increase of nearly 25 
basis points in other short-term rates, and these will induce increases in longer rates since the 
latter are approximately equal to weighted averages of current and expected future short 
rates.  Then if the economy is one in which inflation rates are slow to adjust, changes in 
nominal interest rates become changes in real interest rates, and these have real effects on 
real aspects of cyclical economic activity (e.g., on real output and employment).  But even if 
                                                 
2 Strictly speaking, one needs also to subtract the marginal service yield of the security; I am, as is often the 
case, assuming that yield to be zero. 
  3 the economy is one in which prices adjust very rapidly, the interest rate changes will have an  
impact on nominal aggregate demand and make it possible for the central bank to control 
inflation in the economy.  In what follows, this position—that control over short-term 
nominal interest rates is sufficient for central-bank management of macroeconomic policy—
will be taken for granted.
3   
3. Economies with Very Little Money 
  Notable recent papers by Benjamin Friedman (1999) and Mervyn King (1999) have 
suggested that the ongoing improvement in information-processing technologies could lead 
in the foreseeable future to the near-disappearance of money and the possible loss of central 
bank control over aggregate demand.  Reactions to these suggestions by Charles Goodhart 
(2000), Charles Freedman (2000), and Michael Woodford (2000) were featured in a special 
issue of International Finance, published in July 2000.  A response by Friedman (2000) was 
also included, plus three papers on related but distinct topics by me, Richard Cooper, and 
Otmar Issing.  Next, a long paper by Woodford (2001) and short comments by King (2001) 
and Robert Hall (2001) appeared in a 2001 conference volume from that year’s Kansas City 
Fed symposium at Jackson Hole, Wyoming.   In addition, a set of papers on the topic 
appeared recently in a special issue of the New York Fed’s Policy Review; these include 
articles by Woodford (2002), Marvin Goodfriend (2002), and Sandra Krieger (2002).  In the 
following paragraphs I will attempt to outline the main contours of the argument while 
adding my own evaluation and thoughts at several points.  In the present section the 
discussion will focus on Friedman’s argument, which does not involve the complete 
disappearance of money but instead conjectures that its quantitative importance could 
                                                 
3 A few economists would disagree with this position, but that argument concerns a different set of issues than 
those discussed here. 
  4 diminish to the point that central banks would lose the ability to reliably influence aggregate 
demand. 
  Base money includes, of course, both currency and bank reserves.  Friedman’s 
argument focuses on the latter, presumably because of the standard central bank practice of 
passively accommodating currency demand.  One part of Friedman’s argument is that 
advances in IT make it possible for buyers to make payments by transfer of bank balances of 
a type that are not subject to reserve requirements or even by transfer of account balances 
held with non-bank organizations.  The likely occurrence of such advances is evidently 
accepted by all participants in the debate, but Woodford argues convincingly that the 
magnitude of required reserves is irrelevant.  After all, several central banks—including 
those of the United Kingdom, Sweden, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia—now operate 
successfully with systems that involve no reserve requirements.  Overnight interest rates in 
these economies are controlled by means of “channel” arrangements, involving standing 
facilities that put both a floor and a ceiling on overnight rates.
4  These rates apply to reserve 
balances that banks hold with the central bank, not because reserves are legally required but 
because they are useful for settlement purposes (and to earn any interest that they pay). 
  Woodford’s argument does not assume the existence of currency or reserve 
requirements so it applies quite generally, to any economy in which final payment 
settlements are mediated through balances held with the central bank (assuming that these 
balances serve as the MOA).
5  There is no necessity for currency to be used for transactions 
                                                 
4 The upper limit is established by the central bank’s standing offer to make loans to any bank (with satisfactory 
collateral) at a rate that is (say) 25 basis points above the central bank’s current rate target, while the lower limit 
comes from a standing offer to accept deposits from banks at a rate (say) 25 basis points below the target.  See 
Woodford (2000, pp. 245-6). 
5 I am presuming that these balances should be considered the economy’s MOE and therefore serve as its MOA 
(although the latter conclusion is not strictly implied). 
  5 or for non-bank firms to be excluded from supplying transaction accounts. 
  A related but alternative arrangement involves central bank payment of interest on 
reserves.  This possibility is discussed by Woodford (2000, pp. 242-244, 254-255) and is 
treated extensively by Goodfriend (2002).  If settlement reserves with the central bank are 
held by banks, along with overnight securities, then the interest rate on the latter will equal 
the sum of the interest rate paid on reserve balances plus the marginal service yield provided 
by these balances.
6  By adjusting the interest paid on reserves, then, the central bank can 
exert near-direct control over the overnight interest rate.  The marginal service yield might 
adjust when the reserve rate is changed, but Goodfriend (2002, p. 78) points out that this 
complication can be eliminated if the central bank induces banks to hold reserves of such a 
large magnitude that the marginal (not average!) service yield has been driven down to zero 
(i.e., past the point of satiation).  Then the overnight rate will adjust upward or downward 
point-for-point with the reserve-balance rate.
7  Goodfriend discusses several advantages, 
relative to current U.S. practice, of this approach to monetary policy implementation. 
  It is interesting and instructive to consider the feasibility of negative nominal interest 
rates on overnight loans under the interest on reserves setup.  A negative rate on reserves is in 
principle possible—this amounts to levying a charge for holding settlement balances—and 
the sum of this rate plus a small marginal service yield can be negative.  Thus the marginal 
equality of the previous paragraph seems to indicate that the overnight rate could be made 
significantly negative, and consequently that the payment of interest on reserves offers one 
approach for a central bank to conduct stabilization policy under conditions that call for 
                                                 
6 Assuming, as before, that overnight securities provide no transaction-facilitating services. 
7 Note that the interest-on-reserves method of interest rate control does not require that there be no currency in 
the economy.  If currency is held, then it will be held in sufficient amount that the marginal service yield of 
  6 negative nominal interest rates.  The zero lower bound implied by this marginal equality is 
not a bound on nominal interest rates, but instead a bound on the difference between nominal 
interest rates on securities and on reserves.
8  This difference cannot go negative because it is 
equated, by optimizing asset holders, to the (nonnegative) real marginal service yield on 
settlement balances.  The foregoing does not imply the possibility of significantly negative 
interest rates, however, if the economy is one in which currency (paying zero nominal 
interest) is held and used for transaction purposes.  The reason is that another marginal 
equality also holds, one relating to overnight loans and currency.  Since the interest rate on 
the former is equated, by optimizing asset holders, to the marginal service yield on currency, 
it can go negative only to the extent that the marginal service yield on currency can be driven 
negative.  Presumably, however, this yield can be driven only a few basis points below 
zero—basically because storage of currency is very inexpensive; see McCallum (2000).  
Thus if the central bank made the interest rate on reserves strongly negative, their quantity 
would fall and overnight securities would cease to be held. 
In the type of economy discussed to this point there exists some money.  Currency 
may or may not be used for transactions by households or firms in general, but it is assumed 
that central bank settlement balances are used by banks and firms involved with final 
settlements.  This transaction-facilitating money—central-bank settlement balances—serves 
both as a MOA and MOE.  In the next section we move on to consideration of a more drastic 
case. 
4. Economies with No Money 
  Specifically, we turn now to the more radical case discussed by King (1999, 2001).  
                                                                                                                                                       
currency (which will be a decreasing function of the real quantity held) equals the overnight interest rate. (This 
statement presumes that no explicit interest is paid on currency.) 
  7 The presumption then is that IT advances become so extensive that “there is no demand for 
settlement balances at the central bank because final settlement can be provided by the 
private sector” (King, 2001, p. 379).  Woodford (2001, pp. 254-259) argues that even in this 
case the central bank can control short-term interest rates by varying the rate of interest that it 
would pay on settlement balances kept at the central bank.  In effect, the argument is that the 
overnight market rate will move together with the central bank’s rate on reserves, as a result 
of the optimality condition for private asset holders that the overnight rate equals the reserve- 
balance rate plus the marginal service yield on reserves (with the latter equaling zero).
9  
Goodfriend (2002, p. 81) reaches the same conclusion.        
The just-mentioned equality is necessary for private optimality, however, only under 
the proviso that private asset holders choose positive quantities of both of the assets in 
question.  While I do not doubt the argument of Freedman (2000) to the effect that in actual 
practice central banks will continue to be dominant providers of settlement services for the 
foreseeable future, in principle it could be that private suppliers would supplant central banks 
in this activity (if, say, some private supplier had better computer programmers).
10  And with 
respect to that (unrealistic) case I find one part of Woodford’s argument to be unsatisfactory 
in principle.  That part is the statement that “the unit of account in a purely fiat system is 
defined in terms of the liabilities of the central bank” (2000, p. 257).  Certainly the liabilities 
of the central bank would be a leading contender for the role of MOA in an economy with no 
MOE, but there is no necessity that it be the one that prevails.  Prices will, in a market 
economy, be quoted in terms of whatever medium most market participants find most 
                                                                                                                                                       
8 This is simultaneously the difference between the real rates on securities and reserves. 
9 This equality is a particular case of the marginal-yield condition discussed above. 
  8 convenient.  Just as central bank currency can be supplanted by some other MOE if its supply 
is managed too badly (e.g., under hyperinflation conditions), the central bank’s contender for 
the MOA can conceivably lose out to another medium.  And it is the unit of account actually 
prevailing in market transactions that is of macroeconomic importance; it is stickiness in 
terms of prices used in actual transactions that is relevant for the definition of real rates of 
interest that influence aggregate demand.
11 
In this regard, let us consider the statement of King (1999, pp. 48-49) in which he 
says that “the choice of a unit of account (perhaps a commodity standard, which would 
produce broad stability in the price level) would be a matter for public choice and regulation, 
along the lines of existing weights and measures ….”   Now, it is certainly correct that there 
are public-good or collective aspects to the designation of a unit of account, and that a well-
managed official entry should easily win any competition to become the prevailing UOA.  
But if the national government designated the central bank’s liabilities as the official UOA 
and the supply of these was mismanaged, it is possible that a privately provided commodity 
standard could supplant it.  Specifically, it would be inconsistent with the principles of a 
market economy to have regulations forbidding the quotation of prices in terms of a unit of 
account other than one approved by some official body. 
In any event, such an economy would be a non-monetary economy in the sense 
defined above.  Thus there would be, strictly speaking, no monetary policy.  Nevertheless 
                                                                                                                                                       
10 With respect to the realistic situation, Goodfriend’s (2002) argument emphasizes that the central bank’s role 
as provider of clearing services is thought to be contestable in practice largely because many central banks pay 
no interest on reserves, thereby taxing their own product whenever nominal rates are positive.    
11 In this discussion I am taking it for granted that the relevant concept of “price level” in a non-monetary 
economy is that implied by the MOA.  In McCallum (2000a), it is suggested that the meaning of “price level” is 
questionable in an economy with no MOE. 
  9 there would be scope for different types of policy measures regarding price level behavior, 
with the price level being regarded as some general index of prices in terms of the UOA. 
5. A Commodity-Bundle Monetary Standard 
  Let us consider, accordingly, King’s (1999, p. 49) reference to a commodity-standard 
unit of account.  His discussion continues as follows: “Only if the unit of account was 
[actively] managed would there be a role for a body such as a central bank.  Whether the unit 
of account should be determined by a mechanical rule, as [with] other weights and measures, 
or managed in a discretionary way depends on some deep issues about the nature of “nominal 
rigidities” in such an economy.”  Here King is referring to the literature initiated by Black 
(1970), Fama (1980, 1983), Greenfield and Yeager (1983), Hall (1982, 1983), and Yeager 
(1983), which is critically reviewed in McCallum (1985).  In several of these papers, and 
others that have followed, there is much emphasis on a commodity bundle chosen such that 
movements in its price would closely represent movements in a “general price level.”  It is 
argued by McCallum (1985) that Hall (1983) and Greenfield and Yeager (1983) are wrong in 
their suggestion that such a commodity bundle can be given MOA status by means of a 
simple, non-coercive definition.  The suggestion in those papers is that if some official entity 
were merely to stipulate (non-coercively) that the value of one standard bundle might serve 
as the UOA, then there would be no need for any government (or private!) activity to enforce 
that definition in any manner.  The mere definition would keep the price level, relevant for 
macroeconomic stability, constant over time, thereby ending problems both of inflation and 
inefficient cyclical variability.   
  It is my contention that this suggestion is too optimistic.  One point is that viewing 
the designation of the unit of account as a pure convention, a matter of definition analogous 
  10 to familiar definitions of units of length or time, is inappropriate.  Thus the proper analogue 
to the choice of a unit of length (e.g., the meter or yard) is the choice of units in which to 
express quantities of the medium of account.  It does not pertain to the choice of the 
commodity or type of paper asset or type of accounting entry to serve as the medium of 
account.  Designation of the latter is not a matter of pure convention but instead a matter of 
substantive importance (McCallum, 1985, pp. 37-38).  It is true that given a MOA, the 
designation of a UOA is innocuous, but the designation of a MOA is not; it is analogous to 
the decision whether to measure the “size” of an object by its length, or height, or volume, or 
mass.
12  In particular, if the economy is a monetary economy, even one with only a little 
money, then the MOE will tend to be the MOA.  And even if there is no MOE, about which 
the authors in question are somewhat ambivalent, then a non-coercive designation of the 
MOA would be extremely fragile, since the bookkeeping entries that serve as the MOA 
would not be claims to actual bundles.   
  More substantively, however, I believe that a suitably modified version of the 
Yeager-Greenfield scheme for monetary reform could in fact be viable.
13  To add to the 
realism of the discussion, let us assume that there will be some central bank currency in use 
and that this currency is the MOA, with “dollars” the UOA.
14  Now suppose that the central 
bank seeks to keep the price of a broad standard bundle of goods and services constant at the 
value P*. Next, suppose in addition that the central bank stood ready to exchange standard 
                                                 
12 For example, whether the UOA should be 0.04 or 0.01 grams of gold is innocuous, under the gold standard, 
but the choice of gold rather than silver (or copper or shells) as the standard commodity is not innocuous. 
13 The method to be discussed does not have the “laissez faire” aspects that Yeager and Greenfield desire.  
Accordingly, it is rather similar to the proposal of Irving Fisher (1913a, 1913b).  
14 Goodhart (2000) argues convincingly that currency will not disappear in the foreseeable future, in part 
because of the anonymity provided to its users.  
  11 bundles for currency, or electronic claims to currency, at par.
15  Then the dollar price of a 
standard bundle could not depart significantly from P*.  If the standard bundle were broad 
enough as to represent “the price level,” then price-level stability would be automatically 
assured.  The workings would be much like that of the gold standard, but the UOA price of a 
broad bundle of goods, rather than of gold, would be stabilized.
 16  For a central bank to 
maintain stocks of a large variety of goods (and services?!?) would of course be difficult, so 
Yeager (1985) and Yeager and Greenfield (1989) have stipulated that the central bank’s 
exchanges would not be conducted in terms of physical bundles, but instead in the form of 
some redemption medium (e.g., gold or treasury bills) of equivalent value on current 
markets. With this modification, and with operation by a government-appointed central bank 
(or some alternative agency), the system would I believe be feasible and would keep the price 
of the comprehensive bundle close to a constant par value. 
It has been argued by Schnadt and Whittaker (1993, 1995) that the provision for 
indirect convertibility (i.e., use of a redemption medium other than standard bundles 
themselves) would render the system inoperable, as it would give rise to unlimited arbitrage 
opportunities at the expense of the central bank.  I believe that this difficulty, even if genuine, 
can be overcome.  Rather than enter into a discussion of the type pursued by Schnadt and 
Whittaker (1993, 1995) and Greenfield, Woolsey, and Yeager (1995), however, I will 
proceed by describing a system of the relevant type in a manner that is more closely related 
to current mainstream policy analysis.  Accordingly, let Pt be the dollar price in period t of a 
standard bundle (i.e., the summed price of its components) and let P* be the constant target 
                                                 
15 Realistically, the central bank would have a standing commitment to sell bundles at P*(1 + δ1) and buy them 
at P*(1 − δ2), where δ1 and δ2 are some small positive numbers (e.g., 0.005).  
16 This arrangement is similar to the commodity-reserve money scheme of Milton Friedman (1951). 
  12 value for that bundle.
17  The central bank does not buy and sell bundles themselves, but 
attempts to peg the bundle’s price by buying and selling units of a redemption medium.  Let 
the dollar price in period t of one unit of this medium be PRt.  In each period, the central 
bank offers to buy and sell the redemption medium at a price that makes Pt approximately 
equal to P*, in light of the previous period’s value of a standard bundle in terms of the 
redemption medium, Pt-1/PRt-1.  Thus the bank sets its period-t redemption-medium price at 
PRt = P* PRt-1/Pt-1.  So if Pt-1 > P*, then the central bank reduces the value at which it will 
buy or sell redemption units, relative to the value in period t-1, etc.  Under this arrangement 
there is, I believe, no arbitrage possibility generated; the market price of the redemption 
medium in t will simply equal the value set by the central bank.
18  
An interesting and practical special case to consider is one in which one-period 
government securities (“bonds”) serve as the redemption medium.  Then if we normalize by 
assuming that each of bonds these sells in t for PRt and is redeemed in t+1 for one dollar, the 
per-period rate of interest Rt on such securities is given by 1/PRt = 1+Rt.  Substituting into 
the relation above, we obtain (1+Rt)
-1 = P* (1+Rt-1)
-1/Pt-1.  Taking logs and using the 
approximation log(1+z) = z, we then have Rt − Rt-1 = pt-1 − p*, where pt = log Pt and p* = log 
P*.  Thus we have a policy rule that calls for an increase (decrease) in the one-period 
nominal interest rate when the previous period’s price level exceeds (falls short of) the target 
price level. 
Now, the precise adjustment rule just given might not be optimal, in terms of keeping 
Pt close to P* and avoiding possible dynamic instability.  But the exercise just conducted 
indicates that if there is any interest rate rule that satisfactorily stabilizes a price level around 
                                                 
17 There would be no analytical difference of any significance if we took P*  to equal 1.0. 
18 The central bank could utilize a small spread, of the type mentioned above in footnote 16. 
  13 a constant target, then there is a corresponding rule for adjusting the buy-and-sell price of the 
redemption medium in a Yeager-Greenfield-type scheme, with short-term securities used as 
the redemption medium.  The properties of such rules can be studied in macro/monetary 
models (with rational expectations, if desired) in the manner of today’s standard monetary 
policy analysis, used for example in McCallum (2000b) and Woodford (2002b).  Several 
questions remain, clearly, regarding a desirable form for the rule, the length of a period, the 
use of buy-sell spreads such as those defined above by δ1 and δ2, etc., but the outline for a 
method of studying these seems to be available.  In particular, it should be possible to 
consider the issue of whether it would be better to have an automatic adjustment mechanism 
that keeps the price level as close as possible to some constant target, or alternatively to 
specify a somewhat gradual return toward the target after some shock has driven the price 
level away.  In an economy with sticky prices, it is possible that a rule with prompt return 
would entail greater departures of output and employment quantities from their (efficient) 
flexible-price levels, depending on the specifics of the sticky-price mechanism at work.  
6. International Exchange Rates 
  In conclusion, it seems appropriate to add a few words concerning exchange rate 
issues, since monetary policy and exchange rate management are intimately related.  Indeed, 
while it is not quite true that they are simply different aspects of a single policy, that 
proposition comes closer to being true than the notion that they reflect two genuinely distinct 
macroeconomic policy tools.  Indeed, from a long run perspective it is the case that monetary 
policy and exchange rate policy are but two aspects of one policy—for any stipulated pattern 
of behavior for a country’s exchange rate can be accomplished only by subordinating 
monetary policy to that goal. 
  14   It is well known that during recent years professional opinion has moved toward the 
position that the only truly viable exchange rate regimes, for most countries, are either (i) a 
floating rate that leaves monetary policy available for assignment to domestic objectives or 
(ii) membership in a currency union with a common currency and a single monetary policy 
that is applicable to all members.  This position reflects Milton Friedman’s (1953) pioneering 
argument—i.e., that the self-destructive speculative inducements of a “fixed but adjustable 
exchange rate” make such a system worse than either extreme (i) or (ii)—and it also takes 
cognizance of actual experiences of the most recent decade in Europe, Asia, and South 
America.  My own opinion is that this position is justified—see McCallum (1999)—and I do 
not expect that continuing developments in IT will overturn it during the next few decades.  
Such developments may push the world’s optimal number of currencies somewhat closer to 
1.0, but will not reach that limit. 
  Some writers have lumped single-nation currency board arrangements together with 
currency unions as representing a “hard fix” alternative to floating rates.  But although 
currency boards represent a less precarious arrangement than that of traditional fixed-rate 
regimes, they are still open to abandonment when other policy objectives conflict with 
continued adherence to the currency’s stipulated value.  Hong Kong’s experience has been 
mostly supportive of the currency board position, but the experience of others (e.g., 
Argentina) illustrates the dangers.  Professor Ho’s (2002) recent proposal, for a currency 
board that fixes not the exchange rate but the value of domestic currency in terms of a 
weighted average of goods prices in many nations, thereby representing a “world currency 
unit,” would appear to provide a system that is less likely to yield exchange-rate 
  15 misalignments than a traditional currency-board setup.
19  Also, Ho’s system takes account of 
varying domestic macroeconomic conditions by making the domestic-currency value of the 
world currency unit adjustable.  One resulting problem with this system, if I understand it 
correctly, is that it would imply that various “vintages” of the local currency would be in 
circulation at the same time (i.e., would entail a non-unified currency).
20  This would be a 
major drawback.  
In any event, it seems likely that the coming decades will witness movement toward a 
small number of regional currency unions, including the Euro area, a U.S. dollar area, a 
possible Asian monetary union, and perhaps a few others.  Within each union there would be 
a single multi-national currency and a single monetary policy, with exchange rates across the 
different unions floating rather freely.  Such an evolution would require considerable 
cooperation among nations, of course, and may not come to pass.  But the example of Europe 
suggests that the possibility is not inconceivable.  If such a development were to take place, 
then there would be heightened interest in specifying the role of national monetary 
authorities within the various multi-national currency areas.  A starting point for analysis of 
several issues, relevant in this context, has recently been provided in a thoughtful paper by 
Goodfriend (1999).  
7. Conclusions 
  An extremely brief and non-nuanced statement of this paper’s conclusions is as 
follows. (1) Medium-of-exchange money will not totally disappear in the foreseeable future, 
although the quantity of base money—currency and bank reserves—may continue to decline 
in relation to the volume of economic activity.  (2) In economies with very little money (e.g., 
                                                 
19 The proposal also includes an adjustment to the target value of the currency, in terms of the basket, to account 
for cyclical fluctuations. 
  16 no currency but bank settlement balances at the central bank), monetary policy will be 
conducted much as at present by activist adjustment of overnight interest rates.  Operating 
procedures will be different, however, for some economies including the United States.  
Payment of interest on reserves is likely to become the norm.  (3) In economies without any 
money there can be no monetary policy, of course.  The relevant notion of a general price 
level concerns some index of prices in terms of a medium of account.  Theoretical 
considerations suggest that the liabilities of some official entity such as a central bank might 
serve as the medium of account, but there could be viable rivals especially if policy does not 
generate stability of prices in terms of these liabilities.    (4) Arguments for a broad 
commodity-bundle monetary standard should be of considerable interest.  Such an 
arrangement could be viable, even with a redemption medium that differs from the standard 
commodity bundle, and there is scope for quantitative analysis of the properties of such a 
system. (5) It seems possible that the number of distinct national currencies will decline 
sharply, with the emergence of a small number of currency areas within each of which there 
is a single currency and a unified monetary policy.  Exchange rates across these areas are in 
this case likely to float fairly freely.                   
 
                                                                                                                                                       
20 These different vintages would result from adjustments of the type mentioned in the previous footnote. 
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